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7The Objects of
Face Perception
In a comprehensive series of experiments that com-
bine neural modeling, behavioral data, and fMRI, Jiang
et al. (this issue of Neuron) advance a general object
and face classification model, based on a feedforward
shape-detector architecture. The model accounts for
configural face processing as well as for shape-based
fMRI activation in the fusiform face area (FFA).
The processes underlying face perception have cap-
tured the attention of researchers in many areas of
neuroscience. In fact, many scientists regard face per-
ception as a separate domain of visual processing. Par-
adoxically, however, this would never have been the
case if the study of face perception had treated its sub-
ject matter as merely one example of a whole range of
possible objects. A central theme that has emerged in
research on face perception therefore is whether or
not faces are ‘‘special’’ such that the cognitive and neu-
ral mechanisms that underlie their processing are differ-
ent from those underlying the processing of other visual
objects.
The origin of the modern debate surrounding face per-
ception can be traced back more than 30 years to a piv-
otal paper by Yin (1969). In this paper, Yin effectively dis-
sociated the perception of faces from the perception of
other objects by using the simple manipulation of stim-
ulus inversion. What he found was that face recognition
was much more disadvantaged by inversion than was
the recognition of other classes of objects, such as air-
planes or houses. The discovery of this ‘‘face inversion
effect’’ and the numerous replications of this effect inlater studies have led to the widespread belief that
faces, unlike other objects, are perceived in a configural
manner.
But what is the exact nature of this configural face-
related processing, and why has such a mechanism
evolved specifically for the perception of faces? The tra-
ditional answer to this question is that face perception is
constrained by the fact that all faces are made of very
similar features (i.e., eyes, nose, etc.) that also share
an overall similar configuration (e.g., eyes above nose
above mouth). Therefore, in order to discriminate effec-
tively between different faces, the face recognition sys-
tem must show high sensitivity to relatively small
changes in featural configuration (i.e., the relative dis-
tances between the eyes, the eyes and the nose, etc.)
rather than to the specific form of the features them-
selves (e.g., Diamond and Carey, 1986). Unlike the pro-
cessing of the form of features, which is analytic in nature
and hence should not be affected very much by stimulus
inversion, configural processing, which is tuned to the
specific angle in which the stimuli are usually encoun-
tered, should be highly disrupted by stimulus inversion.
The face inversion effect (along with other ‘‘configural
effects’’; for a review see Maurer et al., 2002) has there-
fore been taken as a benchmark for configural process-
ing. Together with more recent imaging evidence that the
brain regions mediating face perception are separate
from those mediating object perception (Kanwisher
et al., 1997) and by neuropsychological evidence for
a double dissociation between deficits in face and object
perception (e.g., Moscovitch et al., 1997), the configural
account has led to the widespread assumption that not
only are faces and objects processed by different brain
regions, but there are qualitative differences between
the cognitive and neural mechanisms that mediate that
processing.
In this issue of Neuron, Jiang et al. (2006) provide
a compelling array of evidence supporting the idea
that the processing of faces and objects do not rely on
qualitatively different mechanisms. In a series of exper-
iments, Jiang et al. present and integrate findings from
neural modeling, behavior, and fMRI, showing that face
classification, similarly to object classification, can be
achieved by a simple-to-complex architecture, based
on hierarchical shape detectors. Furthermore, variations
of this model can account for both configural and fea-
ture-based processing without qualitative modification
of the model’s structure. Jiang et al. base their neural
face model on a previous computational model devel-
oped by their group, which effectively accounted for
object recognition in the human ventral stream (see Rie-
senhuber and Poggio, 2002). According to this model,
object and face recognition are achieved in a bottom-
up manner by shape detectors with increasing complex-
ities as one moves higher up the ventral stream, giving
rise to complex object detector units that are abstract
in the sense that they can tolerate variations such as dif-
ferences in position or size. Jiang et al. demonstrate that
varying the tuning specificity of these units can result
in face detectors showing a decrease in performance
when faces are inverted. Overall, the performance of
the model is in a good agreement with human face dis-
crimination performance using the same set of faces
(Riesenhuber et al., 2004).
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showed equivalent inversion effects for two different
types of facial stimuli. In the first type, faces shared ex-
actly the same features, but differed in the configuration
of features (i.e., configural variations). In the second
type, feature configuration was kept the same, and the
faces differed only in the shapes of the constituent fea-
tures (i.e., featural variations). The finding of equivalent
inversion effects for configural and featural variations
is not trivial, given the fact that faces with configural var-
iations have been shown to be disrupted by inversion to
a larger degree than faces with featural variations (for
a review see Maurer et al., 2002). In a recent behavioral
study, however, Riesenhuber et al. (2004) proposed
that these differences can be attributed to different pro-
cessing strategies used by the subjects, rather than to
the inherent properties of the face processing system it-
self. Indeed, when processing strategies were equated,
similar inversion effects were found for configural and
featural variations. Jiang et al.’s model, therefore, suc-
cessfully accounts for both face discrimination perfor-
mance and configural effects of face perception using
the same underlying architecture.
Jiang et al.’s modeling and behavioral findings have
strong implications for understanding how faces and
objects are processed in the human brain. To achieve
a direct comparison between the performance of the
model with faces and objects, Jiang et al. tested the
model’s discrimination performance for cars, which,
similarly to faces, share a similar overall configuration
and are considered to have similar processing demands
to the ones involved in face perception. Indeed, a run-
ning theme in the object versus faces debate has been
the extent to which configural effects are unique to
faces. Diamond and Carey (1986), for example, have
shown that ‘‘face-like’’ inversion effects can be ob-
served for nonfacial stimuli, provided that these classes
of stimuli share a similar overall configuration (e.g.,
dogs) and that the subjects have had enough expertise
in identifying this particular class of stimuli. By using
the same model that was used for face discrimination,
Jiang et al. showed that this model produced an inver-
sion effect for cars and that the size of this inversion ef-
fect depends on the degree of expertise with car stimuli
(which was achieved by tighter tuning of the model’s
units to their preferred stimulus shape).
It seems, therefore, that Jiang et al.’s model can effec-
tively account for the behavioral findings that have been
observed in face and object discrimination, but what
constraints does the model put on the functional organi-
zation of the neural substrates involved in face percep-
tion? Robust evidence from human imaging studies
suggests that the ‘‘fusiform face area’’ (FFA) plays a piv-
otal role in the perception and recognition of faces
(Kanwisher et al., 1997). To support the notion that their
model can effectively simulate neural activation in the
FFA, Jiang et al. applied a state of the art morphing tech-
nique combined with rapid event-related fMRI adapta-
tion design (Grill-Spector et al., 2006) to test a key pre-
diction of their shape-based model with respect to the
pattern of fMRI activation in the FFA: namely, that neu-
rons in the FFA should show greater overlap in their sen-
sitivity (i.e., more fMRI adaptation) if the two faces that
are presented share the same shape. In other words,fMRI activation should reflect the low-level visual resem-
blance between the shapes of the faces, rather than
showing an all-or-none sensitivity to the identity of the
faces (Rotshtein et al., 2005). In two different experi-
ments, Jiang et al. provided compelling evidence for
a pattern of activation corresponding to the model’s pre-
dictions, with FFA showing shape-based, rather than
identity-based pattern of activation. A similar pattern
of results was also found for classification performance
in a follow-up behavioral experiment.
These findings provide evidence supporting shape-
based face analysis. Yet, the results of a recent fMRI
study that used a similar design to the one used by Jiang
et al. seem to suggest an opposite, categorically based
pattern of fMRI activation in the FFA (Rotshtein et al.,
2005). In Rotshtein et al.’s study, subjects classified
face pairs of famous celebrities that were morphed to
different degrees along a morphing continuum. The
FFA showed a clear pattern of categorically based acti-
vation, whereas more posterior regions, such as the
occipital face area and the inferior occipital gyrus,
showed a pattern corresponding to shape-based acti-
vation, similar to that found in the FFA in Jiang et al.’s
study. How can these apparently opposite patterns of
results be reconciled? One possibility, discussed by
Jiang et al., is that the categorical pattern of activation
in the FFA found by Rotshtein et al. resulted from top-
down modulation from higher cortical areas, presum-
ably from prefrontal cortex.
An alternative, equally plausible account, however, is
that the difference between Jiang et al.’s and Rotshtein
et al.’s results can be explained by the fact that different
levels of face familiarity were used across studies.
Whereas Jiang et al.’s study used faces that were unfa-
miliar to the subjects prior to the experiment, Rotshtein
et al. presented famous faces, some that were highly fa-
miliar to the subjects (e.g., Marilyn Monroe). It could be
the case, therefore, that face familiarity interacted with
categorical perception (for behavioral evidence see
Beale and Keil, 1995) and that such an interaction re-
sulted in a categorical pattern of activity in the FFA in
Rotshtein et al.’s study but in a shape-based pattern
of activity in the same region in Jiang et al.’s study.
One limitation of such an account, however, is that it is
less parsimonious than the shape-based account in
that it postulates different neural properties for familiar
and unfamiliar faces. Yet, such difficulty can be easily
reconciled if one thinks of face familiarity as a continuum
rather than as two discrete facial categories (for discus-
sion see Goshen-Gottstein and Ganel, 2000).
Regardless of the exact source of discrepancy be-
tween Rotshtein et al.’s and Jiang et al.’s results, one fu-
ture direction in which models such as Jiang et al.’s
could be extended is to incorporate new variables,
such as familiarity and top-down modulation. This could
effectively extend the model’s predictions and general-
izations for both face and object recognition and help re-
solve existing issues in visual recognition. After all, it is
possible that the debate between ‘‘face’’ and ‘‘object’’
based accounts has led to an overshadowing of the
more fundamental problem of identifying the basic ele-
ments underlying object and face recognition. In other
words, it is possible that a better understanding of the
commonalities between the processing of different
demise. This dogma was recently refuted by work in
three independent laboratories and may have far-reach-
ing implications for the treatment of a variety of neuro-
logical disorders. The laboratories involved are those
of David Attwell (University College, London), Robert
Fern (University of Leicester), and Peter Stys (University
of Ottawa). The three groups published new work in
a single issue of Nature showing that N-methyl-D-aspar-
tate-type glutamate receptors (NMDARs) are prominent
on oligodendrocytes or their processes that myelinate
axons and that excessive influx of Ca2+ via NMDAR-
associated ion channels leads to damage of these cells.
Previously, NMDAR-type glutamate receptors were
known to exist on neurons and were thought to contrib-
ute to neuronal damage during ischemia and various
neurodegenerative disorders. However, NMDARs were
not generally thought to effect oligodendrocyte/myelin
injury because these cells were said to lack such recep-
tors. While there were some hints from immunocyto-
chemical evidence that NMDARs might exist on glial
cells, these data were largely ignored. A few groups
had previously reported the presence of functional
NMDARs on rat oligodendrocyte precursor cells from
neurohypophysial explants, on human dissociated
Mu¨ller cells from the retina, and on mouse astrocytic
processes in neocortical slices (Wang et al., 1996;
Puro et al., 1996; Schipke et al., 2001), but again the
widely-held view was that these receptors were rare or
not important on glial cells. Very recently, Lalo et al.
(2006) performed whole-cell recordings with patch elec-
trodes on astrocytes identified in culture or in slices pre-
pared from transgenic mice that express enhanced
green fluorescent protein under the control of the human
glial fibrillary acidic protein promoter. This group found
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9visual categories could form the basis for a better under-
standing of the nature of the differences between the
processing of these categories.
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Glial Cells, and
Clinical Medicine
Recent reports have overturned a series of dogmas
that have been well entrenched in the neuroscience lit-
erature concerning NMDA-type glutamate receptors
(NMDARs). The new data show that NMDARs exist on
the myelin sheath formed by oligodendrocytes, that
an uncompetitive NMDAR antagonist has successfully
passed human clinical trials, and that NMDARs trigger
multiple deleterious cascades to inflict cellular dam-
age on both neurons and glia during cerebral ischemia
(stroke). These recent findings bode well for clinical
intervention with NMDAR antagonists in more neuro-
logical disorders than previously thought, including
multiple sclerosis, cerebral palsy (periventricular
leukomalacia), and spinal cord injury.
The latest scientific myth to be dispelled concerns oligo-
dendrocytes, the glial cells that produce the myelin
sheath of axons in the brain. Previously, it was widely
held that oligodendrocytes have only AMPA (a-amino-
3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazole propionic acid) and
kainate-type glutamate receptors that contribute to their
that functional NMDARs contribute to ionic currents in
cortical astrocytes and that these receptors are involved
in physiological neuron-to-astrocyte signal transmis-
sion. Thus, increasing evidence points to the fact that
functional NMDARs exist on glial cells, including both
astrocytes and oligodendrocytes.
Concerning the potential pathophysiological rele-
vance of these new findings, impairment of oligodendro-
cytes and myelination—leading to what is termed ‘‘white
matter’’ disease—is a major factor in hypoxic-ischemic
disease (stroke), cerebral palsy (periventricular leukoma-
lacia), spinal cord injury, and multiple sclerosis. Hence,
the presence of functional NMDARs on these cells im-
plies that NMDAR antagonists, heretofore thought not
to exert a large effect on these glial cells, might be able
to protect them from these disease processes.
In the first new paper considered here on cells of oli-
godendrocytic lineage (Ka´rado´ttir et al., 2005), David
Attwell’s group performed patch-clamp recordings from
rat oligodendrocyte precursors and from immature and
mature oligodendrocytes in slice preparations of cere-
bellum and corpus callosum. During both simulated is-
chemic conditions and with the application of glutamate,
currents were at least partially inhibited by NMDAR an-
tagonists. With a critical eye, one might say that these
currents were not robust and exhibited rundown. None-
theless, these recordings are technically quite demand-
ing and a real tour-de-force. In this context, they are quite
impressive and strongly support the existence of func-
tional NMDARs on these cells.
